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Because of several conditions, it is rather difficult to carry out an analysis of 
political trust in the post-Communist countries, including the Baltic States. On 
the one hand, these are countries where the traditions of democracy are only in 
the process of formation. We could assume, therefore, that, as democracy 
develops, the trust of the people both in the government as well as civic 
institutions would grow. However, the findings of Western researchers, made 
from surveys in their own countries, may be regarded as not supporting such an 
assumption. These findings rather suggest a downslide in political trust. 
Researchers often even speak about the crisis of representative democracy. 
 
As we analyze the situation in the Baltic States, we have to consider the 
ambivalent nature of this situation: on the one hand, the political trust is 
determined by specific transitional processes and conditions in each particular 
country. On the other hand, however, taking into account the fast information 
exchange, we may not ignore the influence of socio-political changes in 
Western countries on the new democratic states. We may also not exclude the 
possibility that certain disillusionment with representative democracy, which 
can be seen in Western countries, may also create more skepticism and 
criticism in post-Communist countries in respect to democracy and its 
institutions. Even more so, if we take into account the rather high educational 
levels of the population in these countries in combination with the existing 
rather poor living conditions. The situation in the countries of newly restored 
democracy is complicated by the fact that the experience of democracy in these 
countries is quite weak, and dissatisfaction of the people with the slow 
development of democracy contributes to the critical attitudes toward the ways 
in which democracy is implemented and also toward democratic institutions. 
This dissatisfaction is further aggravated by the enormous distance between the 
living conditions in developed countries and in the newly democratic countries, 
especially because this distance has not much diminished during the first ten 
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years of independence for most of the inhabitants in the newly democratic 
countries.  
 
The totalitarian regimes of the 20th century created a significant resonance 
among the political theorists. They not only tried to explain the roots of 
totalitarianism but also created a series of rather pessimistic theories regarding 
the prospects for development of democracy. The Mass Society theory of 
Kornhouser (1960) was one of the reactions toward the totalitarian regimes of 
the first half of the 20th century. In the 1970s, many authors focused on 
shortcomings, even crisis, of representative democracy. To explain it, they 
referred to the theories of the legitimacy crisis, for example, those of O. 
Connor, C. Offe, J. Habermas. The overloaded government theories also 
emerged at that time. The said theories focused on the observation that “the 
demands made by citizens on democratic governments were increasing… at the 
same time, the capacity of governments to realize their policy objectives was 
declining. Habermas argued, that for various reasons, the governmental system 
is increasingly less successful in fulfilling the growing demands of citizens. 
One of the causes was lower economic growth.” 
 
These theories lost their significance in 1990s, because, as the theorists now 
believe, there is no democracy crisis. There are, however, as they argue, more 
or less successful stages of the development of democracy. Accepting the 
opinion that it is more productive to view democracy as a process of changes 
and development, not as a fully developed system, I am inclined to think that 
many findings of the said theories allow us to analyze, by separate indicators, 
those achievements and drawbacks which are experienced by transitional 
societies in their development. For example, under conditions, when the civic 
society, with its institutional structures, has not yet been formed, we may speak 
about an individual who is rather similar to the individual described in the Mass 
Society theory by Kornhauser as an isolated, atomized being who can be easily 
manipulated. 
 
In transitional societies, the situation when the political elite, in addition to 
political issues, is also deeply involved in solving economic problems, is one 
more factor impeding successful functioning of democratic institutions. A vivid 
example of this is the dealing by the government with the privatization process 
in Latvia. In many cases, this issue is “overloaded” by the inability of political 
office holders to separate their own private interests with those of the public, 
which is cause to significant dissatisfaction among the electorate. To draw a 
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parallel with the conflict, described by Offe, between the capital and public 
needs, which the government is unable to solve, we may say that in transitional 
societies (for example, in Latvia) the conflict is rather between the government 
and capital, on the one hand, and the public, on the other hand. This is an 
additional load on the government which reduces political trust. 
 
At the same time, it should be pointed out that there is not only decline of  
theoretical interest in the theories of the crisis of democracy. Rather, these 
theories have not been empirically proven, since empirical studies do not 
justify drastic conclusions about the crisis of democracy. Possibly, this is the 
reason why more “optimistic” theories, which do not focus on “crisis” but 
rather set the task to reveal social changes and explain their determining 
factors, have turned out to be more viable. 
 
During the last decade of the 20th century, several sociologists pointed out that 
the decline of trust in political institutions does not imply the crisis of 
legitimacy. They rather try to look for explanation in the context of 
modernization processes in society. As one example, we may refer to the 
Change of Values theory by R. Inglehart. According to him, growing 
educational levels and information lead to more critical attitudes toward 
political institutions and politicians. Further to modernization of society, there 
is also modernization of individual. This modernization of individual involves 
higher cognitive competence, on the one hand, and change in value orientation, 
on the other hand. Both these processes can be also observed in the newly 
democratic countries. The results of surveys show that people accumulate more 
information, they have more knowledge about and better understanding of 
political ideologies, the process of political decision-making, that the political 
behavior of each individual is more and more based on his or her cognitive 
competence (which was confirmed by the analysis of the behavior of voters 
during the election of the 7th Saeima in Latvia (B. Zepa, 1999.)). At the same 
time, it is typical for transitional societies that the people here have low self-
assessment of their cognitive competence. As it was shown by the  results of 
the study “Role of Government”, carried out by ISSP (International Social 
Survey Program) in 1996, only one fifth of the population of Norway said that 
“most people are better informed about politics and government than I am”. At 
the same time, the proportion of people in Latvia holding such low opinion 
about their own competence was two thirds  (Zepa, 1999). Both these factors, i. 
e. the rise in competence and the low self-assessment weaken the motivation 
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for political participation and, at the same time, create the barrier of distrust in 
relation to political institutions. 
 
Regarding the change in value orientation, the studies carried out in Latvia 
suggest that, like in countries with long experience in democracy, there is a 
change of values, especially among the younger generation. The social values, 
described by R. Inglehart as post-materialistic values, seem to be more 
attractive to the younger generation (Zepa, 1999). It is especially important, 
therefore, to find out whether the trust in institutions is different among people 
from different generations. 
 
 
Support to democracy 
 
On the basis of many comparative studies, many researchers believe that the 
low trust in institutions do not justify conclusions about the crisis of legitimacy, 
since “the legitimacy of democracy  must be evaluated relative to other forms 
of government (Linz, 1988). 
 
Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg (1995), on the basis of EVS data analysis,  also 
point out that the low trust in political institutions does not yet imply a crisis of 
legitimacy, but simply mean that people are not satisfied with the working of 
democracy in their country. Other authors point out that it is better to have a 
critical attitude than blind reliance (Wiberg 1986). 
 
The comparative surveys, carried out in the Baltic States and in other countries, 
also suggest that people in transitional societies are much more dissatisfied 
with implementation of democracy in their countries as compared with people 
who live in countries with lasting democratic traditions. For example, the 
comparative surveys, carried out in the ISSR framework (Role of Government, 
1996), show that only about 1/3 of inhabitants in Latvia and more than 4/5 of 
inhabitants in Norway believe that democracy functions well in their respective 
countries. 
 
The results of the New Baltic Barometer III (1996) show that the low trust in 
political institutions by people in the Baltic States does not yet imply support to 
the former communist regime: only 1% of inhabitants in the Baltic States have 
expressed firm belief that the communist regime should be restored. There are 
slightly more supporters of the communist regime among the Baltic Russians. 
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However, even among them, most have expressed negative attitudes among the 
option of returning back to the communist system. 
 
 
Table 1. Support for communist rule in the Baltics 
“We should return to the communist rule” 
(% of Estonian Estonians, Estonian Russians… ) 
 EstEs
t 
EstRus LatLat LatRus LitLit LitRus 
Strongly agree 0 2 1 1 1 1 
Somewhat agree 1 12 2 8 6 7 
Somewhat 
disagree 
9 31 10 26 15 20 
 Strongly 
disagree 
89 55 87 65 78 71 
Source: Rose, R., Vilmorus, Baltic Data House. New Baltic Barometer. 1997. 
University of Strathclyde. 
 
 
 
At the same time, it should be pointed out that many people in the Baltic States 
hope that the political system in their countries will be improved and will 
become better in the future. It is typical that people in Estonia and in Latvia are 
more critical against the former communist regime, rather neutral against the 
present system of governing, but hopeful regarding the political system in their 
countries in 5 years, believing that it will become better. The attitudes of people 
in Lithuania are slightly different, where inhabitants are most critical toward 
the present system of governing. However, even they are rather positive about 
changes within the nearest five years. These data suggest that people in the 
Baltic States support the political system in their countries and, what is more 
important, is that they have positive expectations regarding the improvement of 
the political system in the future. 
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Table. 2. Attitude of Inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania  toward the system of 
the government: past, present, future. 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Former communist regime 4.69 3.95 4.98 
Present system of governing  5.18 4.55 4.34 
System of governing in five years 6.48 5.93 5.75 
Source: Baltic Barometer, 1999 
Question reads: We want to ask you about how the government works.  
10 on the scale means ‘very good’ and 0 ‘very bad’ (X) 
 
Table. 3. Attitude of Inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania towards 
functioning of the economy: past, present, future. 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Socialist economy before 
independence 
5.48 5.91 6.64 
Present economic system   4.49 3.75 3.56 
Economic system in five years 5.99 5.58 4.89 
Source: Baltic Barometer, 1999 
Question reads: We want to ask you about functioning of the economy. 
10 on the scale means ‘very good’ and 0 ‘very bad’ (X) 
 
 
If we compare the attitudes of inhabitants in the three Baltic States against the 
political and economic system, we can see a direct correlation: when the 
assessment of the economic system is higher (both regarding the current system 
as well as that in the future), the assessment of political system in the country is 
also higher. This is especially the case in Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuania, 
however, the assessment of both economic as well as political system is lower. 
We can see a similar correlation as we compare the expectations among 
inhabitants of the Baltic States regarding changes in their households: 
approximately 40% of Estonia and Latvian inhabitants hope that their 
households will improve within the nearest five years. In Lithuania, less than 
half of the population have such positive expectations. There are also more 
people in Lithuania who believe that the conditions in their households will 
even deteriorate (16%). On the other hand, only about each tenth respondent in 
Estonia and Latvia adhered to such a pessimistic view. 
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Table.4. Expectations of Inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
toward the economic situation of their household in five years. 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Much better/ A little better 39.8 39.4 26.9 
About the same 24.0 28.0 22.3 
A little worse/ Much worse 11.1 10.2 15.7 
Don’t know 25.1 22.4 35,1 
Source: Baltic Barometer, 1999 
Question reads: What do you think the economic situation in your household 
will be in five years time? (%) 
 
 
The comparisons between the three Baltic States lead to the conclusion that the 
assessment of the political situation is influenced by dissatisfaction of 
inhabitants with economic conditions: if the economy in the country is more 
successful and inhabitants have more positive expectations regarding changes 
in their households, they also hold more positive views regarding the 
development of the political system in their country. We see that the perception 
of economic safety among the population is an important precondition for 
political legitimacy of the political system. 
 
 
Trust in state and other institutions 
 
To analyze the trust of the population in institutions, it is rather difficult to find 
criteria allowing us to judge whether trust could be assessed as high or low. To 
solve this question, I have selected different types of comparisons: 
 
Firstly, institutions will be divided into state institutions and civic society 
institutions; 
Secondly, the three Baltic States will be compared with each other; and 
Thirdly, different socio-demographic groups of the population will be 
compared with each other. 
 
Respondents were asked to express their trust in 12 institutions on a 10-points 
scale, where 1 meant “do not trust at all”, while 10 meant “fully trust”. I will 
use the arithmetical mean values as numerical indicators of trust, while the 
analysis of factors will be used as the secondary method of data analysis. 
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As we compare the trust of the people of the Baltic States in different 
institutions, we can see certain similarities. 
• Firstly, there is a tendency among the people in all three countries to 
have more trust in civic society institutions, especially in the church, as 
compared with state institutions. 
• Secondly, in all three countries, people have expressed the least trust in 
the main state institutions (the Parliament and political parties). The 
inhabitants of Latvia and Estonia have also been critical toward their 
Prime Ministers. However, people in all three Baltic States have a high 
level of trust in the Presidents of the State.  
 
 
Table 5. Confidence in institutions: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.(x) 
 Estonia  Rangs Latvia Rangs Lithuania Rangs 
Churches 6.43 3 7.03 1 6.52 3 
Environmental "green" groups 6.55 2 5.82 2 4.48 8 
Mass media 5.48 6 5.70 3 6.75 2 
President 7.42 1 5.57 4 8.90 1 
Military 5.70 4 5.44 5 4.88 6 
Private enterprise  4.11 11 4.85 6 5.00 5 
Courts   5.37 8 4.68 7 3.70 10 
Police 5.02 9 4.67 8 3.82 9 
Trade unions 5.53 5 4.33 9 4.50 7 
Prime Minister 5.45 7 4.05 10 5.62 4 
Parliament 4.88 10 3.90 11 3.43 11 
Political parties 3.65 12 3.05 12 3.26 12 
Sorce: Baltic Barometer, 1999.  
 
 
It is more likely that the high trust in the Presidents of the State is more of an 
emotional character, since the Presidents of the State perform rather 
representative functions in their countries. These are strong personalities, 
therefore the positive attitude toward them is more an indication of emotional 
belonging to the state, while there are less practical expectations toward them, 
as it is the case, for example, when assessing political parties or the Parliament. 
This conclusion may be illustrated by an example from Latvia: when the crisis 
of the Baltijas Banka occurred in 1995, leading to a substantial deterioration in 
budgets of many families, the image of the President of the State “suffered” 
least of all. 
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Apparently, a certain correlation exists: when there are more practical 
expectations regarding a certain institution (state or civic society), there is a 
higher possibility that such institution may get lower public trust. We may 
assume that such attitudes are rather typical for a transitional society. The 
analysis of factors also reveals a similar division among institutions. 
 
Generally, regarding all the three countries, we can conclude that, in the view 
of the population, institutions mainly consist of state institutions and civic 
society groups. This is the case in all three Baltic States if we apply the solution 
matrix with 2 factors. 
If we apply the solution matrix with 3 factors, the major political leaders of the 
country and the mass media form a separate group. In Latvia and Estonia, the 
mass media and private companies form a separate group of institutions. If we 
apply the solution matrix with 4 factors, the same structure remains in 
Lithuania, with the church as a separate component. In Estonia, too, the church 
appears a separate component if we apply the solution matrix with 4 factors. 
There is, however, an interesting feature in Estonia, namely that the borders 
between the state institutions and the civic society institutions tend to “blur”.  
 
 
Table 6. Estonia: confidence in institutions  
(4-factor matrix)   
 Comp.1  Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 
Political parties .696 .109 .277  8.000E-02 
Courts .578 .555 8.000E-02 -.200 
Police .541 .620 5.094E-02 -.107 
Prime Minister .818 .205 9.211E-02 .134 
Military .489 .512 -8.598E-03 .139 
Parliament  .748 .266 .129 .188 
Churches .202 .223 3.597E-02 .845 
Trade unions .5.952E-02 .766 .182 .262 
Environmental "green" groups .211 .635 .183 .254 
Private enterprise .394 -2.852E-02 .714 3.597E-02 
President .687 .146 .181 .297 
 Mass media 3.770E-02 .334 .777 .103 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Sorce: Baltic Barometer, 1999. 
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Table 7. Lithuania: confidence in institutions  
(4-factor solution) 
 Comp.1  Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 
Political parties .713 .345 .155 -4.17E-02 
Courts .867 .175 .132 .106 
Police .826 .136 .171 9.637E-02 
Prime Minister .544 .106 .554 .138 
Military .606 .335 .152 .309 
Parliament  .758 .267 .160 .144 
Churches .182 .205 7.312E-02 .924 
Trade unions .331 .752 .121 .170 
Environmental "green" groups .263 .776 .122 .186 
Private enterprise .153 .610 .333 1.476E-02 
President .182 .129 .854 .124 
 Mass media .129 .267 .792 -4.38E-02 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
 
 
Table 8. Latvia: confidence in institutions  
(4-factor matrix) 
 Comp.1  Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 
Political parties .708 .152 3.687E-02 .123 
Courts .413 .742 8.222E-02 8.899E-02 
Police .247 .832 .127 6.434E-02 
Prime Minister .800 .213 .247 3.949E-02 
Military .379 .558 .388 4.916E-02 
Parliament  .797 .285 .153 9.631E-02 
Churches 6.144E-
02
6.701E-
02
.768 -4.312E-02 
Trade unions .350 .118 .644 9.387E-02 
Environmental "green" groups .134 .220 .646 .327 
Private enterprise .212 -1.864E-
03
6.257E-02 .880 
President .614 .273 .330 .200 
Mass media 2.129E-
02
.520 .192 .583 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
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In Latvia, too, if we apply the solution matrix with 4 factors, the former 
structure of the components remain. However, as compared with Estonia and 
Lithuania, the state institutions split into two groups: 
 
1. the main state institutions (the Cabinet of Ministers, Saeima, the 
President of the State and political parties); 
2. other state institutions (courts, the police, the army) and mass media; 
3. civic society institutions (the church, trade unions, environmental 
“green” groups); 
4. private companies and mass media. 
 
The following conclusions were reached as a result of the factor analysis in the 
three Baltic States:  
• Firstly, there is a sharp division between the two groups of institutions: 
the state and civic society institutions. Notably, the perception of this 
division is less pronounced in Estonia. It is possible that, as we compare 
the attitudes of the inhabitants of these countries, we will be able to 
make more accurate conclusions about the existing tendencies. 
• Secondly, the particular feature of Lithuania is that the main leaders (the 
President of the State and Prime Minister) are separated as a particular 
group. 
• Thirdly, in the view of inhabitants of Estonia and Lithuania, the church 
is more separated from the rest of civic society institutions as compared 
with Latvia. 
 
 
What defines the trust of the Baltic States in institutions 
 
It should be pointed out that trust in institutions differs among various socio-
demographic groups. Notably, however, there are similar correlations in all the 
three Baltic States. 
 
Gender  
 
In all the three Baltic States, women have more trust in institutions than men. 
Private business is an exception: more men than women have trust in private 
companies. 
 
Age  
 
The younger generation (people aged 18 - 30 years) as well as the older 
generation (people over 70) have more trust both in state institutions as well as 
in civic society institutions. We can see the lowest trust in institutions among 
people in the age group 40-50. 
 
Education 
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In all the three Baltic States, people with the lowest education level are those 
who have most trust in state institutions. On the other hand, people with the 
highest education level have more trust in civic society institutions and in 
private business. This correlation does not apply, however, to the attitudes 
toward the church: people with different levels of education have expressed 
high trust in the church. Generally, we can conclude that the group with the 
average education level has the lowest trust in institutions. 
 
 
Self-assessment of one’s own socio-economic status 
 
There is a linear correlation between the self-assessment of one’s own socio-
economic status and the political trust: the higher the socio-economic group, to 
which the person belongs, the higher is his or her trust in institutions: both in 
state institutions as well as in civic society institutions. However, this may not 
be said about the higher socio-economic status groups, since the number of 
people who regard themselves as belonging to the upper class or to upper-
middle class was too low: 0.1% and 1.9% in Estonia, 0.3% and 0.7% in Latvia, 
and 0.5% and 4.4% in Lithuania, respectively. 
The said correlation does not apply to the church. 
 
 
The lowest trust in the main political institutions: the Parliament and political 
parties 
 
The fact that the Parliaments and political parties in the three Baltic States are 
trusted least of all is worth paying attention to. In this attitude, political 
dissatisfaction could be mentioned alongside economic dissatisfaction. This 
could be explained by the fact that the system: government-opposition is not 
functioning efficiently in the post-Soviet states; that political changes through 
elections or governmental crises do not bring about the expected 
improvements. This is the reason why the trust in institutions is not growing 
perceptibly. While the subjects of power change, there are no quality changes 
in the output of the activities of state institutions. Empirically, this has been 
confirmed by the unchanging indicators of trends in political trust. (See the 
enclosure.) 
 
The more effectively the government / opposition mechanism operates, the 
easier it is to limit and canalize dissatisfaction to avoid its generalization to the 
higher level of the system – that is, to dissatisfaction with the formal, 
constitutionally determined, structures of government (Kaase, Newton, 1995).    
 
 
Political culture as the criterion of political trust 
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On the basis of the models of political culture developed by Almond and 
Verba, we may ask how rational is the support rendered by inhabitants to 
institutions (independently of whether it is high or low): how much of it is 
based on understanding, interest in politics, desire to participate, or maybe it is 
an assessment based on emotional attitudes? 
 
In this case, we selected the following features of political culture: 
• interest in politics 
• self-assessment of political competence 
• political efficacy 
• political participation 
 
 
The interest of inhabitants in politics 
 
The data of the survey do not show a linear correlation between the interest in 
politics and trust in institutions: most often, those people had higher trust in 
institutions who were only fairly interested in politics than those who were 
most interested in politics, as it might be expected. This correlation could be 
observed in all the three Baltic States. In Estonia, the exception was trust in 
“greens”: they were trusted most by those people are were actively interested in 
politics. On the other hand, in Lithuania, those people had the highest trust in 
the President of the State who were most interested in politics. 
 
Self-assessment of political competence 
 
When comparing the assessment by the people of their ability to understand 
politics and their political trust, we found that political trust in the Baltic States 
is higher among those inhabitants who assess their competence as equal with 
that of other people, instead of those who have higher self-assessment of their 
political competence. In the case of Estonia, the only exception was the trust in 
the President of the State: the President is more trusted by people with higher 
self-assessment of political competence. In Lithuania, a group could be selected 
with lower self-assessment of political competence – the political trust was also 
lower among them. The political trust is rather similar in groups with average 
and higher self-assessment. 
 
 
Political efficacy 
 
When comparing the opinions of inhabitants about whether they may make 
politicians take into account their demands with their trust in institutions, we 
found that those who assess their possibilities as ideal, have also higher 
political trust as compared with those who assess their possibilities below the 
average or higher than average. 
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Political participation 
 
Similarly, as we consider political participation, we found that the most active 
group of people expressed lower political trust as compared with the medium 
active group. The political trust was lowest in the group that was least active.  
 
Possibly, the aforementioned correlation, which revealed that those people who 
are fairly interested in politics, who have a fair self-assessment of their political 
competence and political efficacy, are those with the lowest political trust, 
refers, to a certain extent, to the ideas of Inglehart who pointed out that the 
most informed (educated) people have more critical attitudes toward political 
institutions. 
 
Therefore, if we consider the prospects for political trust in the future, we may 
not expect any linear correlations. We may not expect, for example, that higher 
levels of education will directly lead to higher political trust. Rather, we may 
expect that changes in different factors, which in itself could be regarded as 
positive, for example, rising of educational levels, may have different influence 
on the political trust which may be rising or falling.  
 
 
The economic condition of individual and trust in institutions: Households 
today 
 
Regarding trust in all institutions, we see the correlation: the higher is the 
assessment of the respondent’s economic condition, the higher is political trust. 
It is especially so in regard to the main state institutions (the Parliament, 
political parties, the Prime Minister and the President). The economic condition 
of the family has a major influence on the trust in the said institutions. 
Taking into account that the most satisfied group in economic terms consists of 
only a few persons (8 people in Estonia as well as in Lithuania), we may not 
conclude unequivocally that this same correlation also applies to them. In 
Lithuania, this group is somewhat interesting since it did not express the 
highest trust in institutions, as it might be expected (and as it is in Estonia). 
 
Households in five years from now 
 
We can see a similar correlation also, as we compare the expectations of people 
regarding changes in their households within the nearest five years. Generally, 
we may conclude: the more positive are expectations, the higher is the political 
trust. It should be pointed out that this correlation is more pronounced in 
Estonia, and it especially characteristic for attitudes toward the main state 
institutions. However, when we consider attitudes toward civic society 
institutions (trade unions, environmental "green" groups, mass media), the trust 
in these institutions is much less affected by expectations regarding the 
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economic condition of the family during the nearest five years. In Lithuania, 
too, as regards all institutions, except for the church, a correlation can be 
observed: the higher are expectations regarding the improvement of household, 
the higher is political trust. However, this correlation only partially applies to 
Latvia, since the group with the highest expectations does not have the highest 
level of political trust. 
 
 
“Winners” and “losers” 
 
Considering how the economic condition of the family has changed as 
compared with what it was before independence, people may be divided into 
“winners” and “losers”. 
 
In this case, too, we can discuss the main trend and particularities in separate 
countries: in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
 
In Estonia, “winners”, i. e. those who assess their households as “much better”, 
are more supportive of institutions. It is interesting to observe, however, that 
those who assess changes in their households as “little better”, are less 
supportive of institutions as compared with those whose households have not 
changed. 
 
In Lithuania, trust in institutions was most often expressed by those whose 
households have not changed as compared with what they were before 
independence. Those people are more critical whose households have improved 
(“a little better” or “much better”), but those people, whose households have 
declined (“a little worse” or “much worse”), have the lowest level of trust in 
institutions. 
 
In Latvia, those people have the highest trust in institutions whose households 
have improved slightly and those with no changes. However, those with much 
improved households are more critical. And, understandably, those people are 
still more critical against institutions whose households have declined. 
 
Generally, the answers to questions about households and trust in institutions 
allow us to make certain conclusions.  
 
• Trust is most directly linked to the current assessment of own 
household: the higher is this assessment, the higher is trust in 
institutions, this correlation can be observed in all three Baltic States. 
 
• Expectations regarding the economic condition of the family during the 
nearest five years are more related to trust in institutions but are not 
related to trust in civic society institutions (Estonia). In Latvia, this 
correlation does not apply to the group with the highest expectations. 
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• Regarding “winners” and “losers”, there is no linear correlation, since in 
Lithuania we see that those people have more trust in institutions whose 
households have not changed. In Estonia, people with unchanged 
households have more trust in institutions than those whose households 
have slightly improved. Again, in Latvia, we see that those people are 
most trustful whose households have slightly changed rather than those 
whose households are “much better”, as it may be expected. 
 
These data suggest the conclusion that the most active groups of the population, 
i. e. those people who have achieved improvement of their households, are 
often more critical toward institutions, especially toward state institutions. This 
tendency is most pronounced in Latvia and in Lithuania. In Estonia, that group 
is interesting among more successful people whose household has improved “a 
little”. Probably, dissatisfaction with what they have achieved also reflects in 
their rather negative attitude toward state institutions. 
 
 
Expectations in regard to the development of the economic and political system 
 
In all the three Baltic States, we observe the correlation that more positive 
expectations regarding the economic development of the country are linked to 
higher political trust. There is a similar, though less pronounced correlation 
between expectations regarding changes in the political system and political 
trust. 
 
To sum up the foregoing analysis, we can conclude that the results of the Baltic 
Barometer 99 may be regarded as one more empirical proof that the “crisis 
theories” do not hold ground even in the post-communist countries of 1990s. 
The main evidence of this is the positive expectations of people in regard to the 
development of democracy in their countries, while economic growth is a 
precondition for it. 
 
Secondly, another major factor defining political trust is economic 
development, since there is a close linkage between the assessment of one’s 
own household and expectations in regard to its development during the nearest 
five years, on the one hand, and political trust, on the other hand. Notably, 
however, those whose economic condition has improved, as compared with the 
time before independence, i. e. the “winners”, are not always most trusting 
institutions. Apparently, this is an evidence of higher demands of these more 
active people and of a certain discontent. To some extent, this refers to the 
conclusions of M. Lauristina about “winners” as the most satisfied people. 
 
Thirdly, the political trust is higher among that part of the population which 
may be regarded as average in terms of cognitive competence, activity, interest 
in politics. On the other hand, those who are better informed and more active 
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are more critical toward institutions. This conclusion correlates with the 
theories of social changes, for example, the Change of Values theory by R. 
Inglehart, according to which modernization of individual is a process running 
parallel to modernization of society, which, on the one hand, means higher 
cognitive competence and, on the other hand, implies a change of value 
orientation. The results of the Baltic Barometer 99 show that the growth of the 
educational level and the cognitive competence of the population contributes to 
a more critical attitude towards state institutions and politicians. On the other 
hand, this could give grounds for the hope that, as the public becomes more 
demanding, the quality of the work of state institutions in the future will also 
improve. 
 
Only the future will show whether the fact that more educated people have 
more trust in civic society institutions could be regarded as a safeguard for the 
development of civic society institutions. 
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Appendix 
 Table1. Gender by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Gender 
 Latvia 
  
Estonia 
  
Lithuania 
   
Political parties .004 .013 .054 
Courts .105 .008 .062 
Police .072 .079 .058 
Prime Minister .029 .061 .007 
Military .057 .052 .001 
Parliament .065 .032 .035 
Churches .047 .003 .064 
Trade unions .093 .124 .052 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.010 .083 .053 
Private enterprise .056 .048 .046 
President .062 .080 .032 
Mass media .039 .065 .007 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
 
Table2. Age by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Age 
 Latvia 
 
Estonia 
  
Lithuania 
  
Political parties .101 .128 .088 
Courts .113 .284 .140 
Police .084 .173 .113 
Prime Minister .044 .200 .125 
Military .108 .107 .087 
Parliament .064 .153 .133 
Churches .142 .083 .075 
Trade unions .127 .132 .133 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.075 .163 .146 
Private enterprise .304 .301 .096 
President .062 .102 .076 
Mass media .113 .089 .099 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
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Table3. Education by  institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Education 
  Latvia Estonia Lithuania 
 
  
Political parties .048 .111 .089 
Courts .107 .073 .052 
Police .138 .125 .054 
Prime Minister .054 .082 .079 
Military .104 .075 .063 
Parliament .050 .060 .076 
Churches .170 .100 .056 
Trade unions .097 .116 .062 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.083 .126 .051 
Private enterprise .088 .096 .110 
President .055 .077 .160 
Mass media .048 .106 .069 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
 
Table 4. Socio-economic status  by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Socio-economic status 
 Latvia    Estonia   
  
Lithuania 
Political parties .106 .138 .071 
Courts .174 .108 .110 
Police .082 .162 .099 
Prime Minister .163 .188 .139 
Military .083 .084 .148 
Parliament .163 .135 .077 
Churches .071 .104 .104 
Trade unions .085 .189 .084 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.096 .121 .087 
Private enterprise .162 .149 .197 
President .158 .141 .136 
Mass media .094 .071 .088 
Baltic Barometer 1999  
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Table 5. Interest in politics by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Interest in politics  
 Latvia  Estonia  Lithuania   
Political parties .157 .219 .114 
Courts .192 .161 .035 
Police .157 .091 .083 
Prime Minister .117 .140 .243 
Military .103 .074 .144 
Parliament .072 .138 .121 
Churches .077 .059 .064 
Trade unions .087 .118 .085 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.145 .076 .127 
Private enterprise .156 .083 .241 
President .104 .118 .262 
Mass media .146 .092 .177 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
 
Table 6.  Political competence by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Political competence  
 Latvia  Estonia   Lithuania 
Political parties .227 .298 .334 
Courts .172 .233 .303 
Police .186 .138 .275 
Prime Minister .134 .253 .274 
Military .179 .134 .275 
Parliament .188 .241 .305 
Churches .145 .146 .176 
Trade unions .134 .161 .261 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.195 .207 .276 
Private enterprise .166 .273 .334 
President .194 .196 .163 
Mass media .150 .140 .153 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
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Table 7. Political efficacy status  by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Political efficacy  
 Latvia  Estonia   Lithuania   
Political parties .224 .313 .375 
Courts .178 .154 .281 
Police .137 .189 .238 
Prime Minister .122 .279 .272 
Military .113 .202 .255 
Parliament .148 .273 .350 
Churches .193 .190 .171 
Trade unions .137 .188 .230 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.127 .178 .273 
Private enterprise .199 .279 .254 
President .167 .196 .151 
Mass media .154 .159 .126 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Household today  by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
  
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Household today  
 Latvia  Estonia    Lithuania   
Political parties .182 167 218 
Courts .150 135 268 
Police .099 118 263 
Prime Minister .162 166 268 
Military .182 087 263 
Parliament .255 153 223 
Churches .045 134 092 
Trade unions .157 108 166 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.100 105 235 
Private enterprise .221 199 258 
President .220 168 215 
Mass media .115 094 187 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
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Table 9.  Household in five years by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Household in five years  
 Latvia  Estonia     Lithuania   
Political parties .245 225 242 
Courts .180 225 199 
Police .110 165 203 
Prime Minister .215 345 284 
Military .192 162 177 
Parliament .273 261 162 
Churches .188 175 158 
Trade unions .177 163 118 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.120 163 220 
Private enterprise .272 302 271 
President .236 272 257 
Mass media .174 163 207 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
  
 
 
Table 10.   Household before independence by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Household before independence  
 Latvia  Estonia     Lithuania   
Political parties .137 222 259 
Courts .121 202 221 
Police .136 096 218 
Prime Minister .199 273 286 
Military .112 090 254 
Parliament .213 204 284 
Churches .060 100 137 
Trade unions .037 041 182 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.081 154 175 
Private enterprise .218 242 219 
President .140 257 203 
Mass media .103 093 213 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
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Table 11. Economic system in five years by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Economic system in five years  
 Latvia  Estonia     Lithuania    
Political parties .311 399 376 
Courts 238 370 398 
Police .225 299 396 
Prime Minister .347 476 467 
Military .271 266 366 
Parliament .385 472 414 
Churches .194 277 294 
Trade unions .251 257 316 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.219 214 293 
Private enterprise .257 307 300 
President .367 497 378 
Mass media .239 206 335 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
 
 
 
Table 12.  Political system in five years by institutions: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
 
Eta, institutions dependent variable 
 Political system in five years  
 Latvia Estonia    Lithuania  
Political parties .404 381 396 
Courts .293 357 455 
Police .281 350 438 
Prime Minister .348 510 552 
Military .303 288 457 
Parliament .441 472 445 
Churches .268 347 297 
Trade unions .281 247 335 
Environmental 
"green" groups 
.251 291 356 
Private enterprise .239 359 307 
President .388 532 505 
Mass media .240 227 292 
Baltic Barometer 1999 
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